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Richard	Layard	|	How	a	job	guarantee	scheme	can
avoid	the	slide	into	long-term	unemployment
Even	if	COVID-19	infection	rates	dwindle,	it	is	now	clear	that	the	economy	is	unlikely	to	bounce	back	quickly.	This
raises	the	spectre	of	long-term	unemployment.	Richard	Layard	(LSE)	explains	how	the	government	could	draw	on
successful	models	used	in	the	UK	and	elsewhere	to	avoid	large	numbers	of	people	disappearing	permanently	from
the	workforce.
Widespread	unemployment	will	be	with	us	for	a	long	time	–	potentially	long	after	a	vaccine	or	an	effective	treatment
for	COVID-19	has	been	found.	Unemployment	is	already	in	excess	of	10	per	cent	of	the	workforce	in	Britain,	the	US
and	elsewhere.	Many	more	have	been	furloughed.	And	even	as	lockdowns	ease,	perhaps	only	temporarily,	those
businesses	that	survive	will	be	reluctant	to	drive	new	hiring	–	more	layoffs	are	much	more	likely.
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This	means	the	jobless	will	struggle	to	find	new	work	and	may	end	up	in	long-term	unemployment.	And	as	we’ve
learned	in	other	downturns,	it	can	be	very	difficult	to	reverse	that.	Employers	are	frequently	reluctant	to	consider
hiring	someone	with	a	long	period	of	unemployment	in	their	recent	history.	For	the	person	seeking	work,	therefore,
a	vicious	cycle	of	failure	and	despair	can	result,	and	they	gradually	withdraw	from	the	labour	market.
Depression	and	ill-health	sometimes	follow,	adding	to	the	burden	on	the	NHS	and	making	it	even	harder	for	the
individual	to	get	back	in	the	workforce.	As	the	workforce	shrinks,	demand	falters	and	tax	revenues	fall	further.
The	first	part	of	our	response	should	be	trying	to	stop	as	many	as	possible	from	becoming	unemployed	in	the	first
place.	The	recent	renewal	of	the	UK	furlough	scheme	is	welcome	in	this	regard,	as	are	two	changes	that	it	will	now
include.	The	first	is	some	element	of	cost-sharing	with	employers.	Without	this,	there	was	a	risk	that	employers
would	have	been	reluctant	to	release	workers	who	have	no	long-term	job,	because	furloughing	is	easier	than
making	them	redundant.
The	second	is	to	introduce	some	measures	to	allow	for	part-time	working	–	a	model	which	has	proven	somewhat
successful	in	Germany.
These	changes	will	make	the	flows	into	unemployment	lower	than	they	would	have	been.	However,	for	the	millions
who	are	already	unemployed,	and	for	the	young	people	who	are	about	to	join	the	workforce	as	the	academic	year
draws	to	a	close,	the	outlook	is	bleak.	In	a	year’s	time	we	could	see	record	unemployment.	That	is	why	we	must
have	the	courage	to	be	radical,	but	also	to	draw	on	the	lessons	of	successful	interventions	in	the	past.
LSE Covid 19 Blog: Richard Layard | How a job guarantee scheme can avoid the slide into long-term unemployment Page 1 of 2
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-05-21
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2020/05/21/richard-layard-how-a-job-guarantee-scheme-can-avoid-the-slide-into-long-term-unemployment/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/
As	a	starting	point,	unemployment	benefits	should	stop	after	a	year,	and	at	that	time	there	should	be	a	guaranteed
offer	of	work.	This	should	be	made	possible	by	the	government	paying	employers	–	be	they	private	sector,	public
sector	or	voluntary	sector	–	to	take	on	people	who	are	at	risk	of	long-term	unemployment.	This	might,	of	course,
stop	them	taking	on	other,	potentially	better-qualified	staff	who	aren’t	at	risk	of	long-term	joblessness	–	but	that	risk
shouldn’t	be	overstated.	This	policy	will	increase	labour	force	supply	and	the	government	can	then	fine-tune
aggregate	demand	to	ensure	it	is	in	line	with	supply.
Models	like	this	have	been	run	successfully	in	many	countries.	To	ensure	they	succeed,	the	allocation	of	the	money
is	best	done	competitively,	where	employers	effectively	bid	for	funds	by	outlining	the	jobs	that	they	propose	to
create.	The	higher	the	quality	of	the	work,	the	more	likely	they	are	to	succeed.	The	worker	should	be	paid	the	going
rate	for	the	job,	though	employment	for	30	hours	a	week	rather	than	full-time	may	be	acceptable.
Note	that	this	is	different	to	schemes	like	‘workfare’,	which	make	continued	benefits	conditional	on	doing	some
activity.	Instead,	a	job	guarantee	pays	you	a	wage	for	doing	a	job.	Ideally,	the	state	would	support	each	job	for,	say,
six	months	–	after	which	the	hope	is	that	the	job	then	continues	without	state	support.	If	not,	the	employees	could
move	on	to	further	placement	efforts.
There	is	no	doubt	that	a	job	guarantee	scheme	requires	support	from	the	state	in	the	form	of	real	money.	However,
the	alternative	would	expenditure	of	real	money	on	benefits,	and	lower	tax	receipts	due	to	foregone	output.
Britain	has	some	experience	with	job	guarantee	schemes.	The	Future	Jobs	Fund	was	launched	in	2009,	with	a
focus	on	training	young	people.	The	scheme	was	evaluated	rigorously,	and	savings	proved	to	be	at	least	half	the
original	cost.	It	also	boosted	GDP.	Moreover,	the	scheme’s	impact	was	not	just	immediate	–	improving	young
people’s	job	prospects	will	positively	affect	their	whole	subsequent	careers,	with	knock-on	benefits	for	the	whole
economy.	This	is	particularly	important	given	that	lockdowns	were	introduced	principally	to	protect	older	people.
That	is	why	the	young	should	be	guaranteed	employment	after	six	months	out	of	work,	rather	than	12.
Active	labour	market	policy,	when	it	is	combined	with	conditions	on	unemployment	benefits,	can	pay	dividends.	The
Hartz	reforms	in	Germany,	for	example,	lead	to	sharply	reduced	unemployment	while	in	neighbouring	France,
unconditional	benefits	were	associated	with	sustained	long-term	unemployment.
Cutting	long-term	unemployment	is	clearly	good	for	the	economy,	but	what	of	individuals?	Would	they	be	happier
doing	work	with	state	support	under	a	job	guarantee	scheme,	or	being	unemployed?	The	evidence	suggests	that
people	on	workfare	are	happier	than	those	not	working.
In	practice,	we	need	to	start	to	find	jobs	for	people	as	soon	as	furloughing	ends,	starting	with	those	who	will	be	the
most	difficult	to	place.	The	case	is	made	even	stronger	by	the	fact	that	this	recession	was	largely	created	by	the
government,	unlike	other	recent	downturns.	We	need	to	act	very	soon	–	or	we	shall	regret	it	later.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog,	nor	LSE.
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